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Abstract
In Possibilistic Decision Theory (PDT), decisions are ranked by a pes-
simistic or by an optimistic qualitative criteria. The preference relations
induced by these criteria have been axiomatized by corresponding sets of
rationality postulates, both a` la von Neumann and Morgenstern and a` la
Savage. In this paper we first address a particular issue regarding the ax-
iomatic systems of PDT a` la von Neumann and Morgenstern. Namely, we
show how to adapt the axiomatic systems for the pessimistic and optimistic
criteria when some finiteness assumptions in the original model are dropped.
Second, we show that a recent axiomatic approach by Giang and Shenoy
using binary utilities can be captured by preference relations defined as lexi-
cographic refinements of the above two criteria. We also provide an axiomatic
characterization of these lexicographic refinements.
1 Introduction
In [3] Dubois and Prade proposed an axiomatic qualitative counterpart of von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern’s Expected Utility Theory [8] where uncertainty is modeled
by possibility distributions on the set of states or situations instead of probability
distributions. Since then, a number of contributions (e.g. [1, 4, 5, 6]) have been
made in order to develop an axiomatic basis for possibilistic decision theory, both
in the style of von Neumann and Morgenstern (where a possibility distribution on
the states is assumed to be given) and in the style of Savage (where the distribution
is induced from a preference relation on the set of decisions).
In Possibilistic Decision Theory two main axiomatic systems have been studied,
that can be respectively represented by two types of qualitative1 utility function-
als, called pessimistic and optimistic, which are generalizations of the well-known
Wald’s maximin and maximax criteria. For example, assume the set of possible
1In the sense that they only involve the minimum, the maximum and an order-reversing
operators
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outcomes in a decision problem is X = {x1, x2, x3, x4} and that the preferences of
the decision maker is x1 ≺ x2 ≺ x3 ≺ x4, where ≺ reads “less preferred than”.
Given a decision d that may result on the outcomes x1 or x4 and a decision d′
that results on x2 or x3, a decision maker following the pessimistic criterion would
choose d′ since the worst outcome of d′, x2, is preferred to the worst outcome of d,
x1. Conversely, a decision maker following the optimistic criterion would choose d
since the best outcome of d, x4, is preferred to the best outcome of d′, x3. The pos-
sibilistic pessimistic and optimistic criteria modulate the maximin and maximax
criteria when the possible outcomes of a decision are not equally plausible.
As already pointed out, for example in [6], these criteria may fail to provide
intuitive results in some situations. For instance, following the above example,
consider two further decisions: d1 which always results on x1, and d4 which always
results on x4. Then according to the pessimistic criterion d and d1 are equally
preferred since both have the same worst outcome. However, it seems reasonable
to prefer d in such a case since there is a chance to obtain the best outcome x4
while with d1 we would obtain x1 for sure. Analogously, d and d4 are indifferent
with respect to the optimistic criteria, while it seems reasonable to prefer d4 since
the best outcome is guaranteed.
To remedy this lack of discriminatory power, which is inherited by the optimistic
and pessimistic possibilistic utilities, several solutions have been proposed. In par-
ticular several ways of refining the resulting preference relation among decisions
have been considered. Dubois et al. [2] consider the refinement of one of the possi-
bilistic utilities by lexicographically combining it with additional criteria to break
ties. For instance, in the above example, if the decision maker uses the optimistic
criterion to refine indifferences yielded by the pessimistic criterion, then he would
choose d in front of d1. Fargier and Sabaddin [5] consider refinements2 of the pos-
sibilistic utilities that agree with the Expected Utility(EU) model. Finally, Giang
and Shenoy [6] propose a modified possibilistic utility based on a two-dimensionally
valued utility function, axiomatized in the von Neumann-Morgenstern style3, they
argue it provides more intuitive results. They claim moreover that this new model
should not be viewed as a (lexicographic) combination of pessimistic and optimistic
utilities like the previously mentioned one in [2]. Weng also considers in [9] a gen-
eral axiomatic system still in the possibilistic framework capable of coping with the
above utility models and some refinements of them.
One of the motivations of this paper is to show that Giang and Shenoy’s model
can indeed be captured by a particular lexicographic refinement of the above men-
tioned pessimistic and optimistic criteria. This is shown in Section 3, after briefly
recalling the basic framework of possibilistic decision framework in Section 2. This
result has lead us to study a new axiomatic characterization of lexicographic re-
finements of possibilistic utilities, which is alternative to the one described in [2].
To do so, and for the sake of having a technically simpler framework to work on,
in Section 4 we first adapt the original axiomatic systems for the pessimistic and
2By means of lexicographic orderings (leximax, leximin) but not on the criteria themselves but
on the representative vectors ((pid(x1), u(x1)), ..., (pid(xn), u(xn))) induced by each decision d.
3Giang and Shenoy’s binary possibilistic utility has been recently axiomatized in the Savagean
framework by Weng [10].
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optimistic criteria to the case where the uncertainty and utility scales V and U
are taken both to be the real unit interval [0, 1], as opposed to the original (and
usual so far) framework where U and V were finite linear and commensurate scales.
Finally, in Section 5, using this new framework we provide an axiomatic approach
to characterize general lexicographic refinements of possibilistic utilities, improving
[2], and paying attention to some cases of particular interest. We end up with some
concluding remarks.
2 The Basic Framework of Possibilistic Decision
Theory
In a possibilistic decision problem one typically considers a (finite) set S of possible
states of the world and the uncertainty about what is the actual state of the world
is represented by a normalized possibility distribution
pi0 : S → V
with values on a finite totally ordered uncertainty scale (V,≤, 0V , 1V ). Decisions
are modeled as mappings
d : S → X
from the set of situations to a finite set of possible consequences (or prizes) X,
where d(s) denotes the consequence obtained by decision d when the state s occurs.
Each decision d induces a (normalized) possibility distribution on consequences
pid : X → V defined as
pid(x) = max{pi0(s) | s ∈ S, d(s) = x} .
A normalized possibility distribution on X is also called a possibilistic lottery. We
shall also use the expression [pi(x1)/x1, pi(x2)/x2, ..., pi(xn)/xn] to denote a lottery
pi where the outcome xi has associated plausibility level pi(xi), with the convention
that impossible consequences (consequences x with pi(x) = 0) are omitted from
the list. The set of lotteries will be denoted by Π(X). Notice that Π(X) is closed
under the operation of standard possibilistic mixture defined as follows. Given n
possibility distributions pi1, ..., pin from Π(X) and n values λ1, ..., λn from V such
that max(λ1, ..., λn) = 1V , then [λ1/pi1, ..., λn/pin] is the (normalized) possibility
distribution defined as
[λ1/pi1, ..., λn/pin](x) = max
i=1,...,n
min(λi, pii(x)) . (1)
This possibilistic mixture construction allows us to express not only simple lotteries
but also compound lotteries. Notice that each consequence x ∈ X can be viewed
also as a lottery pix where pix(x) = 1V and pix(y) = 0V for y 6= x. When no
confusion exists, we will simply use x to also denote pix. Similarly, we shall also
denote by A both a subset A ⊆ X and the possibility distribution on X such that
pi(z) = 1V if z ∈ A and pi(z) = 0V otherwise.With this convention, we can consider
X as included in Π(X).
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In the framework of possibilistic decision theory a` la von Neumann and Morgen-
stern, from the decision maker point of view, a decision d is equivalently described
by its induced lottery pid, hence, ranking decisions amounts to rank lotteries. There-
fore, the main concern will be on the definition of preference relations in the set
of possibility distributions on consequences (i.e. possibilistic lotteries) and the
axiomatic systems of rationality postulates which characterize them.
Given a utility function u : X → U representing the decision maker’s pref-
erences on consequences, where (U,≤U , 0U , 1U ) is a finite totally ordered utility
scale (a consequence x is at least as preferred as x′ whenever u(x′) ≤U u(x)), the
basic possibilistic model introduced by Dubois and Prade [3] propose to define two
preference relations among lotteries according to an optimistic or a pessimistic cri-
terion represented by Sugeno-like integrals which generalize the well-known Wald’s
maximin and maximax criteria. Namely,
d − d′ iff QU−(pid | u) ≤ QU−(pi′d | u) ,
d + d′ iff QU+(pid | u) ≤ QU+(pi′d | u) ,
where
QU−(pid | u) = minx∈X max(n(pid(x)), u(x)) ,
QU+(pid | u) = maxx∈X min(h(pid(x)), u(x)) ,
with n = nU ◦h, nU being the reversing involution on U and with h : V → U being
an onto4 order-preserving mapping linking the uncertainty and utility scales.
QU−(pid | u) evaluates to what extent all possible consequences of d are good,
hence QU−(· | u) models a pessimistic criterion, while QU+(· | u) represents an
optimistic behavior sinceQU+(pid | u) evaluates to what extent at least one possible
consequence of d is good. Notice that both criteria are qualitative in the sense that
they only involve the minimum, the maximum and the order reversing operators,
plus an order-preserving mapping.
In [3, 1], the authors study two axiomatic systems in the style of von Neumann
and Morgenstern (VNM). Namely, the first set of rationality postulates SP for a
preference ordering v on lotteries is the following one:
A1(Structure): v is a total pre-order (i.e. v is reflexive, transitive and total)
A2− (Uncertainty aversion): pi ≤ pi′ ⇒ pi′ v pi.
A3(Independence): pi1 ∼ pi2 ⇒ [α/pi1, β/pi] ∼ [α/pi2, β/pi].
A4− (Continuity−): ∀pi ∈ Π(X) ∃λ ∈ V s.t. pi ∼ [1/x, λ/x],
where pi1 ∼ pi2 means pi1 v pi2 and pi2 v pi1, and x and x denote respectively a
best and a worst consequence according to v. The second system of postulates SO
consists of A1, A3 together with
4The onto condition is not necessary for defining the utilities but it is a technical condition
required for representation purposes, see e.g. [1].
Lexicographic Combinations of Preference Relations in the Context... 161
A2+ (Uncertainty attraction): pi ≤ pi′ ⇒ pi v pi′.
A4+ (Continuity+): ∀pi ∈ Π(X) ∃λ ∈ V s.t. pi ∼ [λ/x, 1/x].
It has been shown that a preference relation satisfying the first axiom system SP
is always representable by a pessimistic utility function QU−, and a preference rela-
tion obeying the second system SO is always representable by an optimistic utility
function QU+. In [4], these two utility functionals are also justified by axiomatic
systems in the style of Savage. The difference is that in the VNM approach, a pos-
sibility function on states is assumed to be given, whereas in the latter approach
such a function is deduced from a preference relation on the set of actions.
The previous systems of axioms were extended in [1] to cope with generalized
possibilistic mixtures operations [λ1/pi1, ..., λn/pin]? induced by a t-norm-like oper-
ation ? on V and defined for any x ∈ X as:
[λ1/pi1, ..., λn/pin]?(x) = max
i=1,...,n
λi ? pii(x) . (2)
Then, if one replaces the original mixtures (1) by these ones in the above axiomatic
systems, call them S?P and S?O, it was shown [1] that the preference relations obeying
S?P and S?O can still be represented respectively by the following pessimistic and
optimistic utilities:
QU−? (pid | u) = min
x∈X
n(pid(x) ? λx), (3)
QU+? (pid | u) = max
x∈X
h(pid(x) ? µx), (4)
with n(λx) = u(x) = h(µx), and n is as above.
3 Coping with Giang-Shenoy’s Utility Systems
Remaining in the same possibilistic framework, Giang and Shenoy propose [6] the
next system SB of four axioms for a preference relation  on lotteries with a min-
based mixture operation (1).
B1(Total pre-order):  is reflexive, transitive and complete.
B2(Qualitative monotonicity): for any λ, µ ∈ V with max(λ, µ) = 1,
[λ/x, µ/x]  [λ′/x, µ′/x] if5 (λ ≤ λ′ and µ′ ≤ µ)
B3(Substitutability): pi1 ∼ pi2 ⇒ [α/pi1, µ/pi] ∼ [α/pi2, µ/pi].
B4(Continuity): ∀x ∈ X,∃λ, µ ∈ V with max(λ, µ) = 1 such that x ∼ [λ/x, µ/x].
5The original condition in [6] was (λ ≤ λ′ and µ = µ′ = 1) or (λ < 1 and λ′ = 1) or
(λ = λ′ = 1 and µ ≥ µ′), but this condition is indeed equivalent to the one used above, see [7,
Lemma 4]





Figure 1: Ordering in UW .
The authors show that this axiomatic system SB is weaker than SP and SO and that
preference relations satisfying axioms B1 through B4 are representable by utility
functions PU similar to QU+ but taking values on a two-dimensional scale, but
still linearly ordered. Indeed, given a finite linearly ordered utility scale (W,≤), one
can define a corresponding linearly ordered binary6 utility scale (UW ,), where
UW = {(a, b) | a, b ∈W,max(a, b) = 1} and  is defined as
(a, b)(a′, b′) iff (a ≤ a′) and (b ≥ b′),
and whose strict part of  is defined as:
(a, b) (a′, b′) iff (a < a′) or (b > b′).
This gives the following linear ordering
(0, 1) ... (w, 1) ... (1, 1)  ... (1, w′) ... (1, 0),
where 0 < w,w′ < 1 of W , and it is depicted in Figure 1.
Then, given a pair of order-preserving mappings k1, k2 : V → W such that
ki(0) = 0, ki(1) = 1, and a binary utility assessment of consequences u : X → UW ,
the utility function PU : Π(X)→ UW is defined as
PU(pi | k, u) = maxx∈Xmin(k(pi(x)), u(x))
where k(v) = (k1(v), k2(v)) for any v ∈ V and min and max denote the point-wise
extension of min and max to W ×W . This kind of utility function PU induces a
total pre-ordering among possibility distributions
6This is the term used by the authors.
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pi  pi′ if PU(pi | k, u)PU(pi′ | k, u)
that satisfies the axioms of system SB , and conversely.
It can be shown that such pre-ordering can be seen in fact as a lexicographic
ordering in terms of suitable evaluations of the pessimistic and optimistic utilities
QU− and QU+. This is based on the following trivial observation.
Lemma 1 Let a, b, a′, b′ ∈ W such that max(a, b) = max(a′, b′) = 1, and let n :
W →W the order-reversing involution on W . Then:
(a, b)(a′, b′) iff (a, n(b)) ≤lex (a′, n(b′)) iff (n(b), a) ≤lex (n(b′), a′)
where ≤lex is the lexicographic ordering on W ×W induced by the ordering ≤ on
W .
Proof: It is enough to check the property for the strict part of the orderings since
(a, b) is indifferent to (a′, b′) in any of the orderings if, and only, if (a, b) = (a′, b′).
We first prove below the equivalence (a, b)(a′, b′) iff (a, n(b)) <lex (a′, n(b′)).
Recall that, by definition, (a, b) (a′, b′) iff a < a′ or b > b′. As for one direc-
tion, assume (a, b)  (a′, b′). If a < a′ it is obvious that (a, n(b)) <lex (a′, n(b′)).
If b > b′ then n(b) < n(b′) and a′ = 1 since b′ < 1, which obviously implies
(a, n(b)) <lex (a′, n(b′)) as well. As for the other direction, assume (a, n(b)) <lex
(a′, n(b′)). If a < a′ we are done. Otherwise, if a = a′, then it must be n(b) < n(b′),
hence b > b′ and we are done again.
As for the other equivalence, (a, n(b)) ≤lex (a′, n(b′)) iff (n(b), a) ≤lex (n(b′), a′),
due to the constraint max(a, b) = max(a′, b′) = 1, it is a matter of routine to
check that the equivalence actually holds in each of the four possible situations
(a = a′ = 1, a = b′ = 1, a′ = b = 1 and a′ = b′ = 1). 
Now, given a binary utility assignment u : X → UW , if we consider its pro-
jections u1, u2 : X → U , i.e. u(x) = (u1(x), u2(x)), of course with the constraint
max(u1(x), u2(x)) = 1 for any x ∈ X, then we can express PU(pi | u, k) = (PU1(pi |
k1, u1), PU2(pi | k2, u2)), where
PU i(pi | ki, ui) = max
x∈X
min(ki(pi(x)), ui(x))
for i = 1, 2. Noticing that n(PU2(pi | k2, u2)) = QU−(pi | k2, u∗2), where u∗2(x) =
n(u2(x)), the next representation it is just a matter of routine checking.
Theorem 1 The preference ordering induced by PU(· | k, u) is the lexicographic
refinement of the ordering induced by QU+(· | k1, u1) by the ordering induced by
QU−(· | k2, u∗2) (or viceversa). That is, for any lottery pi:
PU(pi | k, u)PU(pi′ | k, u)
iff
(QU+(pi | k1, u1), QU−(pi | k2, u∗2)) ≤lex (QU+(pi′ | k1, u1), QU−(pi′ | k2, u∗2))
iff
(QU−(pi | k2, u∗2), QU+(pi | k1, u1)) ≤lex (QU−(pi′ | k2, u∗2), QU+(pi′ | k1, u1)).
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However, notice that in this representation u1 and u∗2 are not independent
utility assignments. Indeed, since max(u1(x), u2(x)) = 1 for all x, then
min(n(u1(x)), u∗2(x)) = 0, i.e. u1(x) < 1 implies u
∗
2(x) = 0.
4 Pessimistic, Optimistic and Binary Utilities on
[0, 1]
While keeping the set X finite, it is not difficult to adapt the pessimistic and
optimistic utility axiomatic systems S?P and S?O to preference relations defined over
Π[0,1](X), the set of possibilistic lotteries with V = [0, 1], and mixture operations
(2) defined by an arbitrary t-norm operation ⊗ on [0, 1]. In fact, as we will see, it is
enough to introduce a uniqueness condition for the paramaters λ and µ in axioms
A4− and A4+. Then the whole framework becomes notationally much simpler.
Indeed, let us consider the axiomatic systems S⊗P ! = {A1,A2−,A3,A4!−} and
S⊗O! = {A1,A2+,A3,A4!+}, where
A4!−: for all pi ∈ Π[0,1](X) there exists a unique λ such that pi ∼ [1/x, λ/x]⊗
A4!+: for all pi ∈ Π[0,1](X) there exists a unique µ such that pi ∼ [µ/x, 1/x]⊗
In the following ⊕ will denote the corresponding dual t-conorm of ⊗ (i.e. ⊕(t, s) =
1−⊗(1− t, 1− s) for any t, s ∈ [0, 1]).
Theorem 2 A binary relation  on Π[0,1](X) satisfies the axioms S⊗P ! iff there
exists u : X → [0, 1] such that, for any pi1, pi2 ∈ Π[0,1](X), pi1  pi2 iff QU−⊗ (pi1 |
u) ≤ QU−⊗ (pi2 | u), where QU−⊗ (pi | u) = minx∈X ⊕(1− pi(x), u(x)).
Proof: One direction is not difficult, let us verify the other. For each x ∈ X there
exists a unique λx such that x ∼ [1/x, λx/x]⊗. Then define u : X → [0, 1] by
u(x) = 1− λx.
It is clear that u(x) = 1. By axiom A4!−, x ∼ [1/x, µ/x]⊗ for some(unique) µ,
then by axiom A3, x = [1/x, 1/x]⊗ ∼ [1/[1/x, µ/x]⊗, 1/x]⊗ = [1/x, 1/x]⊗, hence
u(x) = 0.
Now, for any pi ∈ Π[0,1](X), define QU(pi) = 1 − λpi, where pi ∼ [1/x, λpi/x]⊗.
Due to axiom A4!−, QU is well defined (indeed, by axiom A4!−, one can check
that [1/x, µ/x]⊗ ∼ [1/x, λ/x]⊗ iff λ = µ) and represents . We want to prove that
QU = QU−⊗ (· | u). This is done in the following steps:
• It is easy to check that QU and QU−⊗ (· | u) coincide over the lotteries
[1/x, λ/x]⊗. Moreover, by definition of u, QU(x) = u(x) for all x ∈ X.
• QU([1/x, λ/y]⊗) = min(u(x),⊕(1−λ, u(y))). Indeed, A4!− guarantees there
exist α and β such that x ∼ [1/x, α/x]⊗ and y ∼ [1/x, β/x]⊗. Using A3, we
have
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[1/x, λ/y] ∼ [1/[1/x, α/x], λ/[1/x, β/x]]
= [1/x,max(α,⊗(λ, β))/x].
Hence QU([1/x, λ/y]) = 1−max(α,⊗(λ, β)) = min(1−α,⊕(1−λ, 1− β)) =
min(u(x),⊕(1− λ, u(y)).
• QU([1/pi1, 1/pi2]⊗) = min(QU(pi1), Q(pi2)). Indeed, there exist α and β such
that [1/pi1, 1/pi2]⊗ ∼ [1/[1/x, α/x]⊗, 1/[1/x, β/x]⊗]⊗ = [1/x,max(α, β)/x]⊗,
therefore QU([1/pi1, 1/pi2]⊗) = 1 − max(α, β) = min(1 − α, 1 − β) =
min(QU(pi1), Q(pi2)).
• QU(pi) = minx∈X ⊕(1 − pi(x), u(x)). Since pi is normalized, let xj be such
that pi(xj) = 1. Without loss of generality assume j = 1. Defining
pii = [1/x1, pi(xi)/xi]⊗ for i > 1, then pi = maxi>1 pii, hence QU(pi) =
miniQU(pii) = minimin(u(x1),⊕(1 − pi(xi), u(xi))) = minx∈X ⊕(1 −
pi(x), u(x)).
This ends the proof. 
In an analogous form, one can also prove a similar characterization of preference
relations induced by optimistic possibilistic utilities.
Theorem 3 A binary relation  on Π[0,1](X) satisfies the axioms S⊗O! iff there
exists u : X → [0, 1] such that the utility QU+⊗ (· | u), defined as QU+⊗ (pi | u) =
maxx∈X ⊗(pi(x), u(x)), represents .
Proof: Similar to the previous case. In this case, for each x ∈ X there exists µx
such that x ∼ [1/x, µx/x]⊗. Then define u : X → [0, 1] by u(x) = µx and then
define QU([1/x, µ/x]⊗) = µ and check that QU(·) = QU+⊗ (· | u). 
Finally, one can show that a similar adaptation of Giang-Shenoy axiom system SB
for standard possibilistic mixtures (i.e. with ⊗ = min) can be done in order to
have a representation theorem in terms of binary utilities on [0, 1], and again the
issue is to guarantee that two distinguished lotteries [λ/x, µ/x] and [λ′/x, µ′/x] are
indifferent only in the case λ = λ′ and µ = µ′. Indeed, let us consider the following
enforcement of postulate B2:
B2!(Qualitative monotonicity): for any λ, µ ∈ [0, 1] with max(λ, µ) = 1,
[λ/x, µ/x]  [λ′/x, µ′/x] iff (λ ≤ λ′ and µ′ ≤ µ)
Notice that we have only formally changed and “if” by and “iff”. Then one can
prove the following modified representation theorem.
Theorem 4 A binary relation  on Π[0,1](X), equipped with the min-possibilistic
mixture operation, satisfies the axioms SB! = {B1,B2!,B3,B4} iff there exists
u : X → U[0,1] such that the utility
PU(pi | u) = maxx∈Xmin(pi(x), u(x)),
represents  in the following sense: it holds that pi  pi′ iff PU(pi | u)PU(pi′ | u),
for any pi, pi′ ∈ Π[0,1](X).
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The proof is an easy adaptation of [6, Theorem 2] and will be omitted.
Finally, let us remark that for generalized ⊗-possibilistic mixtures on the set of
lotteries Π[0,1](X) with ⊗ being the algebraic product, Giang and Shenoy [7] have
recently proposed another axiomatic system for decision making where uncertainty
is modeled by likelihood functions. Their system of postulates, call it SB!, is
actually the same than SB! but applied to product-possibilistic mixtures, and it
is characterized again by binary utilities, formally similar to the PU above, hence
using [0, 1] as uncertainty and utility scales as well, but exchanging min by product.
Theorem 5 ([7]) A binary relation  on Π[0,1](X), equipped with the product-
possibilistic mixture operation, satisfies the axioms SB! = {B1,B2!,B3,B4} iff
there exists u : X → U[0,1], with (0, 1), (1, 0) ∈ u(X), such that the utility
PU(pi | u) = maxx∈Xpi(x) u(x),
represents , where pi(x) (u1(x), u2(x)) = (pi(x) ·u1(x), pi(x) ·u2(x)), i.e. it holds
pi  pi′ iff PU(pi | u)PU(pi′ | u), for any pi, pi′ ∈ Π[0,1](X).
5 Lexicographic Refinements: New Postulates
In this section we propose a general axiomatic approach for preference relations on
Π[0,1](X) which are representable by a lexicographic combination of one possibilistic
utility with another one. Although the combination of the utilities could in principle
be arbitrary (pessimistic-optimistic, optimistic-pessimistic, two pessimistics, two
optimistics), for the sake of simplicity we will restrict ourselves to the case of
lexicographic combination of an arbitrary pessimistic utility QU−⊗ (· | u1) and an
arbitrary optimistic utility QU+⊗ (· | u2). The only consistency condition we will
require to u1 and u2 is that they share at least one best outcome and one worst
outcome. That is, we will assume there exist x and x in X such that u1(x) =
u2(x) = 1 and u1(x) = u2(x) = 0.
For a given t-norm ⊗ and a given utility assignment u : X → [0, 1], consider
the pessimistic and optimistic preference orderings on Π[0,1](X):
pi −u pi′ ifdef QU−⊗ (pi | u) ≤ QU−⊗ (pi′ | u),
pi +u pi′ ifdef QU+⊗ (pi | u) ≤ QU+⊗ (pi′ | u).
Using them, we can consider the binary utility functional Fu1,u2⊗ : Π[0,1](X) →
U × U defined by
Fu1,u2⊗ (pi) = (QU
−
⊗ (pi | u1), QU+⊗ (pi | u2)).
We can define then on Π[0,1](X) the total pre-ordering lexu1,u2 induced by Fu1,u2⊗
and by the lexicographic ordering ≤lex on U × U . Namely,
pi lexu1,u2 pi′ ifdef Fu1,u2⊗ (pi) ≤lex Fu1,u2⊗ (pi′).
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In other words, pi lexu1,u2 pi′ if either pi ≺−u1 pi′ or (pi ∼−u1 pi′ and pi +u2 pi′ ).
Notation: in the rest of this paper, and for the sake of a simpler notation, we will
denote the ⊗-mixture operation on Π[0,1](X) simply by [...] instead of [...]⊗.
The following properties of lexu1,u2 are interesting and easy to check.
Proposition 1 The following properties hold:
(i) pi −u1 pi′ iff [1/pi, 1/x] lexu1,u2 [1/pi′, 1/x].
(i) pi +u2 pi′ iff [1/pi, 1/x] lexu1,u2 [1/pi′, 1/x].
(i) For all x, x′ ∈ X, x lexu1,u2 x′ iff (u1(x), u2(x)) ≤lex (u1(x′), u2(x′)).
In view of these properties, let us consider the following system S⊗PO =
{A1,A3,L2,L4!,L5PO} of postulates for a preference relation  on Π(X)[0,1]
where
L2: if pi ≤ pi′ then [1/pi′, 1/x]  [1/pi, 1/x] and [1/pi, 1/x]  [1/pi′, 1/x].
L4!: for all pi ∈ Π(X)[0,1], there exist unique λ, µ ∈ [0, 1] such that [1/pi, 1/x] ∼
[1/x, λ/x] and [1/pi, 1/x] ∼ [µ/x, 1/x],
L5PO: pi  pi′ iff either [1/pi, 1/x] ≺ [1/pi′, 1/x] or ([1/pi, 1/x] ∼ [1/pi′, 1/x] and
[1/pi, 1/x]  [1/pi′, 1/x]).
As usual, in the above postulates x and x denote respectively a minimal and max-
imal element of X with respect to .
Lemma 2 If  satisfies A1,L2,L4! and L5PO, then x  pi  x for all pi ∈
Π(X)[0,1].
Proof: Let us prove that x  pi, the other relation pi  x is proved analogously.
By L5PO, x  pi iff either [1/x, 1/x] ≺ [1/pi, 1/x] or ([1/x, 1/x] ∼ [1/pi, 1/x] and
x  [1/pi, 1/x]). Notice that x  [1/pi, 1/x] holds by L2. Therefore to prove x  pi
it is enough to prove [1/x, 1/x]  [1/pi, 1/x]. And to prove this, by L4!, there exists
λ such that [1/pi, 1/x] ∼ [1/x, λ/x]. Now, since [1/x, λ/x] ≤ [1/x, 1/x], by L2, we
have [1/x, 1/x]  [1/x, λ/x] ∼ [1/pi, 1/x]. 
If x and x continue respectively denoting a maximal and minimal element of X
w.r.t. a preference relation , then we can define two new relations − and +
on Π(X)[0,1] as follows:
pi − pi′ ifdef [1/pi, 1/x]  [1/pi′, 1/x],
pi + pi′ ifdef [1/pi, 1/x]  [1/pi′, 1/x].
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If  represents a lexicographic combination, then these new relations allows us to
recover in a sense the properties of the original relations, as the following lemma
shows.
Lemma 3 Let  satisfy A1,A3,L2 and L4!. Let x and x be a maximal and
minimal element of X w.r.t. . Then:
(i) x − pi − x, and x + pi + x, for all pi
(ii) − satisfies the axioms S⊗P !
(iii) + satisfies the axioms S⊗O!
Proof: We prove only the properties for −, the ones for + can be proved in a
similar way.
(i) By definition, x − pi iff [1/x, 1/x]  [1/pi, 1/x]. But, by Axiom L4!, there
exists λ such that [1/pi, 1/x] ∼ [λ/x, 1/x], and it is clear that [1/x, 1/x]  [λ/x, 1/x]
by Axiom L2. On the other hand, by definition, pi − x iff [1/pi, 1/x]  [1/x, 1/x] =
x, and again this is clear by the above Lemma 2.
(ii) We actually only need to prove that − satisfies Axiom A3. Namely,
assume [1/pi1, 1/x] ∼ [1/pi2, 1/x]. By A3 for , [α/[1/pi1, 1/x], β/pi] ∼
[α/[1/pi2, 1/x], β/pi], that is, [α/pi1, α/x, β/pi] ∼ [α/pi2, α/x, β/pi]. Again, by A3,
[1/[α/pi1, α/x, β/pi], 1/x] ∼ [1/[α/pi2, α/x, β/pi], 1/x], that is, [α/pi1, β/pi, ] ∼−
[α/pi2, β/pi]. 
Theorem 6 A preference ordering  on Π(X)[0,1] satisfies the system of postulates
S⊗PO if, and only if, there exist two mapping u1, u2 : X → [0, 1] with u−11 (1) ∩
u−12 (1) 6= ∅ 6= u−11 (0) ∩ u−12 (0) such that, for all pi, pi′ ∈ Π(X)[0,1],
pi  pi′ iff Fu1,u2⊗ (pi) ≤lex Fu1,u2⊗ (pi′).
Proof: One direction is easy. As for the other direction, assume  satisfies (A1)
through (L5PO). By Lemma 3, its associated relations − and + satisfy the
axioms S⊗P ! and S⊗O! respectively. Therefore, by Theorems 2 and 3, we have:
• there exists u1 : X → [0, 1] such that −=−u1
• there exists u2 : X → [0, 1] such that +=+u2
By Lemma 3, u1(x) = u2(x) = 1 and u1(x) = u2(x) = 0. For every x ∈ X, by
axiom A4!−, there exists λx such that x ∼− [1/x, λx/x], hence QU−⊗ (x | u1) =
QU−⊗ ([1/x, λx/x] | u1), hence u1(x) = 1− λx. On the other hand, by axiom A4!+,
there exists µx such that x ∼+ [1/x, µx/x], hence u2(x) = µx. Finally, by Axiom
L5PO,  is the lexicographic ordering defined by −u and +u , in other words, we
have for all pi and pi′, pi  pi′ iff Fu1,u2⊗ (pi) ≤lex Fu1,u2⊗ (pi′). 
It is easy to check that if we would replace axiom L5PO by axiom L5OP , where
L5OP : pi  pi′ iff either [1/pi, 1/x] ≺ [1/pi′, 1/x] or ([1/pi, 1/x] ∼ [1/pi′, 1/x] and
[1/pi, 1/x]  [1/pi′, 1/x]).
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then the axiom system S⊗OP = {A1,A3,L2,L4!,L5OP } would capture the prefer-
ence relations over lotteries defined as the lexicographic refinement of an ordering
induced by an optimistic criterion by an ordering induced by a pessimistic criterion.
In these representations, the utility assignments u1 and u2 are unrelated, except
by the condition u−11 (1) ∩ u−12 (1) 6= ∅ 6= u−11 (0) ∩ u−12 (0), which says, as already
mentioned, that they share a maximal and a minimal element of X. But it is not
difficult to find suitable postulates to be added to the system S⊗PO (or to S⊗OP ) in
order to guarantee some interesting further conditions on the utility assignments u1
and u2 in the representation theorems. For instance if one is interested in getting
a representation where u1 and u2 are the same, the postulated to be added to S⊗PO
is:
L6: there exists λ such that [1/x, 1/x] ∼ [1/x, (1−λ)/x] and [1/x, 1/x] ∼ [λ/x, 1/x]
Indeed, one can prove the following representation theorem.
Theorem 7 A preference ordering  on Π(X)[0,1] satisfies the system of postulates
S⊗PO plus L6 if, and only if, there exists a single mapping u : X → [0, 1] with
u−1(1) 6= ∅ 6= u−1(0) such that, for all pi, pi′ ∈ Π(X)[0,1],
pi  pi′ iff Fu,u⊗ (pi) ≤lex Fu,u⊗ (pi′).
Proof: Inspecting the proof of Theorem 6, it turns out that, by using Axiom L6,
x ∼− [1/x, (1 − λx)/x] and x ∼+ [1/x, λx/x], hence u1(x) = 1 − (1 − λx) = λx =
u2(x). Since this is for all x ∈ X, u1 = u2 . 
Similarly, if one is interested in getting the utilities u1 and u2 related in the
same way as in the Giang-Shenoy model, i.e. fulfilling min(u1(x), 1 − u2(x)) = 0
for every x ∈ X (see Theorem 1), the following additional postulate
L7: if [1/x, 1/x] ∼ [1/x, λ/x] with λ < 1, then [1/x, 1/x] ∼ [1/x, 1/x].
guarantees the required constraint, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 8 A preference ordering  on Π(X)[0,1] satisfies the system of postulates
S⊗PO plus L7 if, and only if, there exist two mapping u1, u2 : X → [0, 1] with
u−11 (1)∩u−12 (1) 6= ∅ 6= u−11 (0)∩u−12 (0) and with u2(x) = 1 if u1(x) > 0, such that,
for all pi, pi′ ∈ Π(X)[0,1],
pi  pi′ iff Fu1,u2⊗ (pi) ≤lex Fu1,u2⊗ (pi′).
Proof: Inspecting the proof of Theorem 6 again, it turns out that, by using Axiom
L7, if x ∼− [1/x, λx/x] with λx < 1 then x ∼+ [1/x, 1/x], that is, if u1(x) =
1− λx > 0, then u2(x) = 1. 
As an interesting corollary of this last theorem, we have that the systems S⊗PO
plus L7 of lexicographic refinements actually capture both Giang-Shenoy systems
SB! and SB! for particular choices of the t-norm ⊗.
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Corollary 1 For lotteries in Π[0,1](X) equipped with the ⊗-possibilistic mixture
operation, we have:
1. when ⊗ = min, the system S⊗PO plus L7 is equivalent to the system SB!;
2. when ⊗ = product, the system S⊗PO plus L7 is equivalent to the system SB!.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have proposed a possibilistic decision framework a` la von Neumann
and Morgenstern style in which uncertainty and the decision maker’s preferences
can be measured in the real unit interval [0,1] instead of finite qualitative scales as
in previous works, and the model is suitably adapted for capturing both pessimistic
or optimistic behaviours.
Preference relations defined as a lexicographic combination of the pessimistic
and optimistic criteria are characterized in an alternative way as done in [2], more
directly in terms of the proper (refined) relation instead of in more explicit terms
of the pessimistic and optimistic preferences involved. In particular, it has been
shown that preference relations obeying the axiomatic system SB proposed by
Giang and Shenoy [6], and representable by binary possibilistic utilities, can indeed
be also represented by preference relations defined as a lexicographic refinement
of one pessimistic criterion by an optimistic criteria. Interestingly enough, the
same relations are obtained independently if the optimistic criterion is refined by
the pessimistic one, which is not usually the case in the general lexicographic
refinements. This reinforces the idea (already claimed in [6]) that the system SB
indeed captures the common fragment of the pessimistic and optimistic systems
SP and SO.
Acknowledgements
Authors are grateful to an anonymous reviewer of a preliminary version of this
paper for his/her helpful comments. Lluis Godo acknowledges partial support of
the Spanish project MULOG, TIN2004-07933-C03-01.
References
[1] D. Dubois, L. Godo, H. Prade, and A. Zapico. On the possibilistic-based de-
cision model: From decision under uncertainty to case-based decision. Intl. J.
of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems, 7(6):631–670, 1999.
[2] D. Dubois, L. Godo, H. Prade, and A. Zapico. Advances in Qualitative De-
cision Theory: Refined Rankings. In Proc. of IBERAMIA-2000, LNAI 1952,
Springer, pp. 427-436, 2000.
[3] D. Dubois and H. Prade. Possibility theory as a basis for qualitative decision
theory. In 14th Int. Joint Conf. on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI’95), pages
1924–1930, Montreal, 1995.
Lexicographic Combinations of Preference Relations in the Context... 171
[4] D. Dubois, H. Prade and R. Sabbadin. Decision-theoretic foundation of quali-
tative possibility theory. European Journal of Operational Research 128 (2001),
478-495.
[5] H. Fargier and R. Sabbadin. Qualitative decision under uncertainty: back to
expected utility. Artificial Intelligence Volume 164 (1-2), 2005, pp. 245-280.
[6] P. Giang and P. Shenoy. Two Axiomatic Approaches to Decision Making Using
Possibility Theory European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 162, No. 2,
2005, pp. 450–467.
[7] P. Giang and P. Shenoy. Decision Making on the Sole Basis of Statistical
Likelihood. Artificial Intelligence, Volume 165 (2), 2005, pp. 137-163
[8] J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern. Theory of Games and Economic Be-
havior. Princeton University Press, 1944.
[9] P. Weng. Qualitative decision making under possibilistic uncertainty: Toward
more discriminating criteria. In Proc of 21th Annual Conference on Uncer-
tainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI-05), AUAI Press, pp. 615-623 (2005).
[10] P. Weng. An Axiomatic Approach to Qualitative Decision Theory with Binary
Possibilistic Utility. In Proc. of ECAI 2006 - 17th European Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, G. Brewka et al. eds., Aug. 29 – Sep. 1, 2006, Riva del
Garda (Italy), IOS press, pp. 467-471
